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On Febuary 16, 2008, Mr. Gonzales was arrested for agg-
rivated assault and attempted strangulation. 
On Febuary 19, 2008, an arraignnent was held and donestic 
battery, aggravated battery, first degree kidnapping, ass-
ault with intent to commit a serious felony, and battery were 
additionally charged. 
On Febuary 29, 2008, a preliminary hearing was held and 
charges were bound over to district court. 
On September 15, 2008, a pretrial conference was held to 
address the issues of alibi witness, 404(b) evidence, and expert 
testimony. 
On September 24, 25, 26 2008, trial was heid and on th~ 
third day (September 26, 2008) the jury found Mr. Gonzales guilty 
of attempted strangulation, aggravated battery with a weapon 
enhancenent, second degree kidnapping, two counts of domestic 
battery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon 
ennancement, and battery. 
On December 15, 2008, sentencing was held and Mr. Gonzales 
received 6 years fixed, 19 years indeterminate for a total of 
25 years. 
On December 18, 2008, a notice of appeal was filed on the 
behalf of Mr. Gonzales. 
On December 19, 2008, a motion for reduction of sentence 
(i.e.rule 35) was led. 
On Janaary 7, 2009 an order denying r1le 35 motion witho1t 
hearing was issued. 
On Febuary 10, 2010, an unpublished opinion of appeal was 
filed with the remitter following on March 5, 20010. 
On January 28, 2011, a petition for post-conviction rel 
was filed and was amended on March 10, 2011. 
On September 13, 2011, an evidentiary hearing on post 
conviction was held 
On October 5, 2011, judgnent of dismissal with prejudice 
was filed. 
This appeal follows. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
On Febuary 19, 2008, the petitioner was charged with 
Donestic Battery, A misdemeanor(count IX), which was alleged 
to have occurred on Febuary 12, 2008. He was also charged with 
Attempted Stangulation, a felony (count III); and Domestic 
Battery, a misdemeanor (countIV); together with a weapon enhance-
,nent, all were alleged to have occurred on Febuary 13, 2008. 
Lastly, the petitioner was charged with Assault with the Intent 
to Commit a Serious Felony, a felony (count VI), and Battery, 
a misdemeanor (count VII), together with a weapons enhancement, 
which were alleged to have occurred 16, 2008. 
On September 26, 2008, a jury returned a verdict of guilty 
as to the charges of Attempted Strang~lation, Aggravated Battery 
with a weapons enhancenent, second degree kidnapping, two counts 
of misdemeanor Domestic Battery, two counts of Aggravated Assault 
with a weapons enhancenent, and misdemeanor battery. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
To prevail on ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the defiency. 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (ct.App 
1995)
1 
Dlgfs V. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243,1248 (ct. 
App. 9 
2 
To establish a deficiency, the appellant has the burden 
showing that the attorney 1 s representation fell below a 
objective standard of reasonableness. Argon V. State, 114 Idaho 
758,760,760 P.2d 1174,1176 (1988) 
To establish prejudice, the applicant 1nust show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney 1 s deficient perfomance, 
the outco~e of the trial would have been dif rent. Aragon V. 
State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174,1176 (1988) 
The govern legal standard plays a critical role in defining 
the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from 
councel's errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction the 
is wbether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent tne errors the fact finder would have nad a reasonable 
doubt respecting guilt. Srtickland V. Wasnington, 104 s.ct. 
at 2069 
ARGUMENT 
1. Was Counsel's Representation Deficient By Legal Standards 
And Was That Deficiency Prejudicial? 
p~rpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee counsel 
is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
j reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, 
any iciencies in counsel's performance mJst be prejudicial 
to defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance 
~nder the constitution. Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. at692 
In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. 
United States V. Cronic, 466 US. At 659 
3 
Mr. Gonzales asserts that counsels performance at and before 
trial was deficient, and as a result of the deficiency, manifest 
inj~stice has occurred when tne j~ry returned gJilty verdicts 
to co~nts I,II,III,V,and VI. 
At an evidentiary nearing on Mr. Gonzales post-coviction 
petition held on September 13, 2011, tne district court, in 
denying the States' motion for a direct verdict, cTr p.49, ln.11-
22 dicta, foLlnd taat: 
11. There is testi.nony in the record that the 
12. defendant was never snown Exhibit 102, 0£ Exhibit A 
in this 
13. proceeding prior to the admission evidence. Clearly 
14. if in fact as the defendant testified it was something 
that 
15. he had not prepared, then certainly there would have 
been 
16. grounds to object to it. 
17. At this point in time the court does not find 
18. that there was any reasonable basis to believe that 
coJnsel 
19. would allow Exhibit A, because certainly I think that 
20. Exhibit A was prejudicial to the defendant, based on 
all 
21. the evidence presented in the trial. So the States 
motion 
22. for a directed verdict will be denied. 
Mr. Gonzales testified at his post-conviction hearing (Tr. 
p.35, ln 2-12) that he never bad the opportunity to view Exhibit 
102, now Exhibit A, prior to trial; that he never provided 
counsel with any written statements indicating his guilt of 
untrutas as to his whereabouts on Febuary 13, 2008 (Tr.p.33, 
ln.4-11) and that no objection was made by counsel at trial 
to the admission of Exhibit 102 (Tr.p.35,ln. 18-21 )(sic)(Lisa 
Moore testified at trial that the letter was written by Mr. 
Gonzales)(Tr.p.13-21) 
4 
The Strickland, coJrt agreed that tne Sixth A~endment 
imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, beca~se reasonably 
effective assistance must be based on professional decisions 
and informed legal cho scan be ~ade only after investigation 
of options, Strickland V. Washington, 104 s.ct. at 2061 
The Strickland court f~rther went on to state thate; If 
there is only one plausible line of defense ... counsel must 
conduct a 11 reasonably substantive investigation" into that line 
of defense, since there can be no strategic choice that renders 
svcb an investigation unnecessary. Id at 1252. The same duty 
exists if counsel relies at trial on only one line of defense ... 
Id at 1253(quoting Rummel V. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103,104(eAs 1979) 
Tne scope of tne duty,however, depends on such facts as 
the strength of the governments case and the likelihood that 
pursuing certain leads may prove more harmfJl than helpfJl. 
693 F.3d at 1253, n 16 
Mr. Gonzales has always maintained his innocence as to 
those most serious of charges; count I, attempted Strangulation; 
count II, aggravated battery w/ I.e. §19-2520 weapons enhance 
ment; count III, kidnapping in the 2nd degree; count V, 
aggravated assault w/ I.e. §19-2520 weapons enhancement; and 
countVI aggravated assault w/ I.e. §19-2520 weapons enhancement. 
The petitioner asserts that counsel's representation at 
trial was grossly in adequate to the advisarial process by not 
informing him of the existence of Exhibit 102 prior to its 
admission in open court and by allowing Lisa Moore to testify 
as to its authenticity without objection. If counsel nad 
performed a "reasonably substantive investigation" into Exhibit 
102 (i.e. a nandwriting analysis), then counsel would have 
provided the defendant the ability to refute the testi~ony of 
Lisa Moore, throJgh expert testimony; as well as through nis 
alibi witnesses. 
5 
Mr. Gonzales asserts that an expert; as to nis handwriting 
on Exhibit 102 when presented to Lisa Moore for her testinony; 
would have put enough doubt into the juries minds as to his 
guilt to counts I,II,III,V, and VI. Mr. Gonzales has always 
maintained his innocence to those charges, and counsels only 
strategy for trial was actual innocence whetner that be by alibi 
witnesses not called, or by refuting Lisa Moores testimony at 
trial. 
Fundamental error is on that so profoundly distorts the 
proceedings that it produces manifest injustice, depriving 
the criminal defendant of the fundamental rignt to due process; 
error which goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's 
rignts, goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the 
defendant a rignt which was essential to his or ner defence 
and which no court could or ougnt to permit to waived. State 
V. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 945 P.2d 1390 (ct.app. 1997) 
Mr. Gonzales' fundamental right to a fair and impartial 
trial and the right to confront and cross-examine the states 
case was deprived him by counsels failure to; a) inform him 
of Exhibit 102 prior to its admission at trial and; b) by denying 
him the right to pJt the states witness and evidence to its 
fullest test through an expert witness(handwriting analyst), 
to refute Lisa Moores testimony as to the autnenticity of exhibit 
102. 
The district court has acknowledged that exhibit A (Tr. 
Ln. 19-21) was prejudicial to the defense, ( ... I think that 
exhibit A was prejudicial to the defendant, based on all the 
evidence presented in the trial.). The court furtner ackowledges 
that the foundation for Lisa Moors testimony regarding exhibit 
A was not established (Tr. p.44, ln. 18-21 )( ... certainly the 
testimony of Lisa Moore does not lay the foundation for the 
admissibility of it? There was no foundation laid to establish 
tnat it was so~etning written by the defendant.) 
6 
Mr. Gonzales avers that by comparing addendun A(Exnibit 
102) and addendun B(handwriting sample) this court can see that 
a handwriting analysis should be of consequence to s~pport his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
At Mr. Gonzales' post-conviction ing,lead counsel, 
(Dan Taylor), testified that he had foond a so-called confession 
letter (Tr.p.56 ln. 13-25; p.57, ln.1-8) a week before trial 
wnich led him to decide not to call Mr. Gonza s' alibi witnesses 
at trial. 
Co-counsel(Stacy Gosnell) testifi at the same hearing(Tr. 
p.83, ln. 15-20) that it was one or two days before trial prior 
when she personally discovered the so called cofession letter. 
She also testified th~t the alibi witnesses had already been 
preped for trial prior to its discovery. 
Both counsel and Co-consel said t the so-called 
confession letter is not in the file, nor can either counsels 
remember how and when it got in the file. 
Mr. Taylor also testified(Tr.p.51 ln.16 25,p.52 ln.1) 
(Tr.p.53 ln.2-10) that he nad just taken over the PJblic Defender 
Contract a mere 3 weeks prior to the scheduled trial. Mr. Taylor 
also testified that he did not speak with Mr. Gonzales until 
a week or two after he knew about Mr. Gonza s' case. 
This court nas long adhered to the proposition that tactical 
and strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-
guessed on appeal ~nless those isions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other short comings 
capable of objective evaluation. Howard V.State,126 Idaho 231, 
233,880P.2d 261,263(ct.app. 1994) 
Counsels lack of preparation for trial by not having a 
handwriting expert verify the authenticity of exhibit 102, the 
failure to even object to its admission at trial,preserving 
the issue for direct appeal, cannot be found to be either 
adeg0ate representation, ors ic or tactical decision, 
acceptable to the adversarial process. 
7 
Farther, co~nsels performance, or lack thereof, has 
contributed not only to findings of guilt dJe to inadequate 
preparation for trial but also by not presenting proper jJry 
instrJctions regarding the deadly weapons enhancement, I.C. 
§19-2520. 
Tne United States Supreme CoJrt in Apprendi, stated tnat 
''under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
notice and jJry trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,any 
fact(other than prior convictions) that increases the naxi~~m 
penalty for a crime must be charged in the indictment, s0bmitted 
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt''(citing Jones 
V. United States,526 i.s. 227,119 s.ct.1215(1999)Apprendi V. 
New Jersey,530 i.s. 466(2000) 
The Apprendi,court so found that the Winship's dJe process 
and associated j !iry protections extend, to some degree, "to 
determinations that [go] not to a defendant's guilt or innocence, 
but si.mply to the length of his sentece. "Almendarez-Torres, 
523 u.s. at 251, 118 s.ct. 1219(scalia J. dissenting) 
Under Apprendi, the court reasoned that;(1) constitutional 
limits exist to States' authority to define away facts necessary 
to =onstit0te a criminal offense, id at 85-88, 106 s.ct. 2411, 
and(2) that a state scheme that keeps from the jury facts that 
"expos [ e] [defendants] to greater or additional punisn. nent." 
id at 88,106 s.ct. 2411, nay raise serious constitutional 
conserns. 
Even Idaho law speaks to tnis matter in that Idaho Code 
§19-2520 requires that the state must charge the weapons enhance-
ment prior to the preliminary hearing. 
Charging weapons enhancements as separate counts in 
indictment was required by statute I.C. §19-2520 State V. Rhoades 
119 Idaho 594,809 P.2d 455(1991) Because the firearm enhancement 
stat.ute increases the maximum penalty for the charged offense 
by fifteen years, the jury must find the facts that trigger 
the enhancement. I.C.§19-2520 State V. McLeskey,138 Idano 619, 
69P.3d 111(2003) 
Q 
Mr. Gonzales avers that the jJry was not even informed 
of the weapons enhancement at trial nor were they given the 
opportunity to find those facts necessary to trigger said 
enhancement. The jury was only provided a qJestionaire in the 
form of yes and no 3nd a discription of a deadly weapon, to 
wit, a knife, whicb was the element of aggravated battery,count 
I; and the aggravated assaults in count V and VI. 
Because aggravated battery and aggravated assault requires 
a firearm or other deadly weapon be used to com~it the fense 
of aggravated battery and aggravated assault the jury did not 
find tne facts necessary to trigger tbe enhance~ent nor were 
they provided choice of jury nJllification as to its 
application to the wnderlying offense charged. 
Had the trial proceeded with an information or verdict 
part II, charging Mr. Gonzales specifically with I.C.§19 2520, 
the jJry would not have found Mr. Gonzales guilty of weapons 
enhancement after first finding him guilty of aggrava battery 
I.C.18-907 and aggravated assault18-905, bJth which require 
the use of a deadly weapon in its commission. 
Tne long standing practice in Idaho Nitb regard to 
enhancenents(i.e. I.C.§19-2514) persistent violator enhancement, 
and I.C.§18 8005(l,) DUI enhanced penalty statute, is through 
bifurcating said trial. 
At not was the jury presented with an infor~ation or 
verdict part II at trial specifically addressing the enhancenent 
charge, I.C.§19-2520. 
By not insuring that Mr. Gonzales' trial was bifurcated 
as to the enhance~ent charge, Mr. Go~zales was further prejudiced 
by improper jury instructions not given regarding tne enhanced 
penalty statute which attached itself to counts II,V,andVI, 
thereby ~aking coJnsels representation inadequte. 
9 
Conclution 
Mr. Go~zales has shown that his counsel was deficient in 
representing his interests at trial. The 
the state bJth agreed that co~nsels fai 
102 at trial was deficient. the court bel 
prejtldiced by that evidence at trial. 
strict court and 
to object to exhibit 
him to be 
In the interest of jJstice the Appellant moves this court 
for an Order of Remand and Reversal of Conviction and moves 
tnis court for a new trial. 
Sab~itted thi day of January 2013 
Cnristopuer Gonzales 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF SEVICE 
I CERTIFY that on this:.21day of January 2013, I caused 
a tr~e and correct copy of the foregoing docunent to be: 
hand delivered 
faxed 
to: Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
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_R_e_s_.p~o_n_d_e_n_t__,_, ________ ) 
State of Ida.ho 
County of Ada 
ss 
DOCKET NO. 39517-2012 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER 
GONZALES 
I, Christopher Gonzales, after first being duly sworn upon 
his oath deposes and says: 
1. Taat I am cJrrently incarcerated at the Idaho Correction 
Center located in south Boise and am under the care 
custody and control of Tim Wengler, warden. 
2. That I am the autaor of the attached hand written state-
ment ~ade for the purpose of analysis by the court 
and in support of my appellant argunent. 
DATED this ,J,.,q day of January 2013. 
.) , \. I I 
f 
\ .. ' 
1 -~ ',,1 "1 1 \ ,.i;li 
I' _,· / 
Christopher Gonzales 















DOCKET NO. 39517-2012 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. SMITH 
State of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
State of Idaho ) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
I Charles E. Smith, after first being duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am an inmate at the Idaho Correctional Center 
located in so'.ith Boise, and am under the direct care 
castody and control of Tim Wengler, warden. 
2. That I read from Exhibit 102 to Mr Gonzales the words 
that appeared thereon. 
3. That I witnessed Mr. Gonzales writd,ing said words on 
a separate piece of paper labeled as exhibit A and 
attached to his affidavit. 
DATED this 
\' 
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clL~if-~-, 
' ' ~.-' Cnarles E. Smitn 
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